GIA case adjourned to July 16

June 21, 2010 (Page 3 Lead)

THE Financial Division of the Accra Fast Track High Court will on July 16, 2010 decide whether or not to refer to the Supreme Court for interpretation, a request for relevant documents on the case involving five persons who are accused of causing financial loss to the state regarding the sale of Ghana Airways and the operations of Ghana International Airline (GIA).
The court fixed the date after the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Ms Gertrude Aikins, had argued the state's case against the request by the defence team for materials pertaining to the case.
The accused persons are Dr Richard Anane, a former Minister of Transport; Mr Kwadwo Mpiani, a former Chief of Staff and Minister for Presidential Affairs; Dr Anthony Akoto Osei, a former Minister of State at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning; Mr Sammy Crabbe, a former Greater Accra Regional Chairman of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), and Prof. George Gyan-Baffour.
They variously face 22 counts of causing financial loss to the state, defrauding by false pretences, conspiracy to deceive public officers, deceit of public officer, misappropriation of public funds, opening an offshore account without authorisation from the Bank of Ghana (BoG), conspiracy to commit stealing and stealing.
They have pleaded not guilty to the charges and the court, presided over by Mr Justice Bright Mensah, has granted them self-recognisance bail.
All the accused persons except Professor Gyan-Baffour were present. Professor Gyan-Baffour has been granted permission to seek medical treatment abroad.
As usual, the family members and sympathisers of the accused persons defied the wet weather and thronged the court premises to lend their moral support to them.
Counsel for the accused persons have filed applications requesting for relevant documents to aid their defence, under Article 19 (2e) of the 1992 Constitution, which states that “a person charged with criminal offence shall be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence”.
But the State has opposed the application on the grounds that sections 163 and 181 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1960 (Act 30) do not allow accused persons who are standing trial summarily to have access to such documents before they are tendered in evidence as exhibits.
Following the State's opposition, lawyers for the accused prayed the court to refer their request for an order directed at the Attorney-General to furnish them with all documents and exhibits the prosecution intends to rely on during the trial to the Supreme Court for interpretation.
According to the lawyers, Act 30, which the State relied on, clearly contravened Article 19 (2e) of the 1992 Constitution, which they described as being "supreme to all laws of the land".
According to the accused persons, all documents, including letters, technical evaluations and reports, business plans, press releases, Cabinet memos, memoranda of understanding (MoU), shareholders’ agreement, tenancy agreements, among a host of others, were what the prosecution intended to rely on during the trial and it was important that they had access to those documents in order to have a fair trial as enshrined in the Constitution.
The lawyers have argued that the Constitution compelled the Attorney-General to provide the accused persons with appropriate documents to facilitate their defence and further argued that the apparent conflict between the prosecution and the defence needed to be handled by the Supreme Court.
Issues intended to be referred to the Supreme Court are whether or not within the plain, natural and practical meaning of Article 19 (1) and (2e) of the Constitution, an accused person in a criminal trial, whether charged summarily or by indictment, is entitled to a disclosure of copies of statements made to police by persons who will and may be called to testify as prosecution witnesses and copies of documents and exhibits which are to be offered in evidence by the prosecution before trial, among others.
However, arguing the case for the State in Accra yesterday, Ms Aikins described the defence team's application as misconceived based on the fact that the Criminal Procedure Code gave accused persons the opportunity to have access to documents tendered in evidence, cross-examine witnesses, ask for longer dates to prepare their defence, have access to a lawyer of their choice, as well as the have the right to remain silent among a host of other rights.
She said the burden of proof of guilt of an accused person solely lay on the prosecution and for that reason it could not be said that the prosecution had an unfair advantage over the accused persons, adding that "ambush or anachronistic litigation does not occur in this matter at all".
According to her, the accused persons were facing a summary trial and not trial by indictment and under the circumstance, the Criminal Procedure Code had clearly spelt out rules which guaranteed the interest of accused persons.
She, therefore, argued that it was out of place for the defence team to request for materials which had not been tendered in evidence and, worse of all, argue that a simple statutory matter which could be handled by the court should be referred to the Supreme Court for interpretation.
According to Ms Aikins, there was no need to invoke the referral jurisdiction of the lower court because the court was not bound to refer all matters to the Supreme Court upon request, especially when issues raised did not border on the Constitution.
She described the defence team's submissions as frivolous and an attempt to delay proceedings and eventually stall the trial and further prayed the court to dismiss the application in its entirety.
Ms Aikins reminded the defence team that they had the right to go on appeal should the court refuse to grant their request.